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N.J.R.E. 608 AND SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT:
THE TIME HAS COME FOR NEW JERSEY TO JOIN THE
MAJORITY
Jenn Montan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Every trial, whether criminal or civil, requires the factfinder, whether
judge or jury, to carefully weigh the competing evidence and determine the
disputed issues between the parties. As such, the right of the parties to
impeach the credibility of the witnesses is fundamental to the truth-seeking
process in all litigation. The right to impeach is considered such an important
right that Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 607 expressly authorizes witness
impeachment and provides that “[a]ny party, including the party that called
the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”1
There are various, well-recognized grounds for impeaching the
credibility of a witness. For example, a party may show that a witness is
biased in favor of or against a particular party, that the witness lacks
competency because of a mental or sensory incapacity or a lack of personal
knowledge, or that the witness has made a prior statement which is
inconsistent with the witness’s testimony.2 Another recognized method for
impeaching the credibility of a witness is to demonstrate that the witness
possesses a character trait for untruthfulness. An attack on a witness’s
character for truthfulness is designed to demonstrate that the witness is by
disposition untruthful and therefore not credible as a witness in any case.3 It
is this impeachment attack that raises difficult questions as to the proper
method for proving a witness’s character for truthfulness and the extent to
*
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1
FED. R. EVID. 607. New Jersey Rule of Evidence 607 similarly authorizes and extends
the right to impeach to the party calling the witness. See N.J. R. EVID. 607 (“Except as
otherwise provided by Rules 405 and 608, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the
credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the
witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .”).
2
ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 2.1 (2017).
3
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6111 (2d ed. 2017).
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which untruthful character evidence may be shown through crossexamination or through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Specifically, the question arises whether, and in what manner, a witness
may be impeached with specific instances of non-conviction misconduct that
are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness. The New Jersey
Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in State v. Scott, a case which
squarely presented the division between FRE 608 and New Jersey Rule of
Evidence (N.J.R.E.) 608 and triggered two divergent concurring opinions as
to the proper course for New Jersey law going forward.4
With respect to impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness,
both FRE 608(a) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) expressly provide that a party may
attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness through the
introduction of character witnesses who may testify in the form of reputation
or opinion as to the witness’s character for truthfulness.5 In addition, FRE
608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) both prohibit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to prove specific instances of conduct in order to attack or support
a witness’s character for truthfulness.6
FRE 608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) diverge, however, on whether inquiry
on cross-examination may be permitted as to specific instances of conduct
that are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness. FRE 608(b)
expressly provides that the court may allow such inquiry on crossexamination,7 whereas N.J.R.E. 608(a) prohibits such inquiry.8 N.J.R.E.
608(a) provides that “a trait of character cannot be proved by specific
instances of conduct”9 and New Jersey courts interpret this provision to
prohibit not only the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific instances
of conduct, but also inquiry as to such conduct on cross-examination.10 FRE
608(b) provides in pertinent part:
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s
4

State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017).
FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by
testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character . . . .”); N.J. R.
EVID. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the witness’
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . .”).
6
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); N.J. R. EVID. 608(a).
7
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
8
N.J. R. EVID. 608(a)
9
Id.
10
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (“N.J.R.E.
608, however, bars not only the use of extrinsic evidence but also cross-examination into
specific instances of misconduct.”).
5
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character for truthfulness. But the court may, on crossexamination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative
of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: (1) the
witness; or (2) another witness whose character the witness being
cross-examined has testified about.11
N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, provided, however,
that the evidence relates only to the witness’ character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and provided further that evidence
of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise. Except as otherwise provided by Rule
609 and by paragraph (b) of this rule, a trait of character cannot
be proved by specific instances of conduct.12
New Jersey’s formulation falls in the minority approach with respect to
the use of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for
truthfulness.13 Only a few other states have a complete ban on the use of
specific instances of conduct.14 This departure from FRE 608(b) became the
focal point of debate between Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin in State
v. Scott.
In State v. Scott, the defendant, Thomas Scott, faced possession of
heroin charges.15 At trial, “[h]e argued that he did not knowingly possess the
heroin because someone else placed it in his jeans pocket before he put them
on.”16 Defendant planned to have his mother, Darlene Barbella, testify in
support of this contention.17 Barbella was going “to testify that she found
the heroin in defendant’s apartment” lying on a table next to “defendant’s
cousin and known drug user, Jordan Scott,” and “placed the heroin in the
pocket of a pair of jeans she believed belonged to Jordan.”18 To impeach
her, the State planned to question Barbella about two prior instances where
she allegedly lied to the police to exonerate her son, the defendant.19 The
trial court ruled that the State’s evidence was admissible and as a result,
defendant did not call Barbella but instead called another witness “to testify

11

FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
N.J. R. EVID. 608(a) (emphasis added).
13
Scott, 163 A.3d at 338 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
14
See FLA. STAT. § 90.609 (1978); ILL R. EVID. 608; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-422(d)
(1964); MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608(b); OR. R. EVID. 608; TEX. R. EVID. 608(b).
15
Scott, 163 A.3d at 328.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
12
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to the same events.”20
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
evidence would have been admissible at trial.21 In holding that the trial court
abused its discretion by ruling that the proposed impeachment testimony was
admissible, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that
Rule 608 provided grounds for admissibility.22 The court noted that “Rule
608 explicitly excludes specific instances of conduct as a means of proving
a character for untruthfulness, permitting only opinion or reputation
evidence.”23
This finding by the court regarding the application of N.J.R.E. 608
prompted concurring opinions from Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin
debating whether New Jersey’s bar on the use of specific instances of
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness is still a proper
approach.24 Chief Justice Rabner argued that the outcome of the case
highlights the problems posed by the current rule.25 As a result, the Chief
Justice proposed that it is time to consider whether N.J.R.E. 608 should be
revised to fall in line with the majority of states and its federal counterpart
FRE 608.26 Chief Justice Rabner highlighted the disadvantages of New
Jersey’s rule and called upon the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on
the Rules of Evidence to consider the question for “a simple reason: the topic
relates directly to the jury’s search for the truth, which a system of justice
should foster.”27
In response, Justice Albin argued that no justification for altering the
current version exists.28 Justice Albin explained that the current Rule is in
line with the development of New Jersey’s common law, which has always
barred such evidence because its probative value “is outweighed by the
potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a case.”29
Justice Albin posited that while New Jersey’s rules may not be perfect, they
“accommodate two important goals: the search for truth and the need for
fairness in [the] criminal and civil justice system.”30
State v. Scott highlighted some of the problems and dangers N.J.R.E.
608 has created, and presented the opportunity to assess New Jersey’s
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id.
Scott, 163 A.3d. at 330.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 335 (Rabner, C.J., concurring); Id. 340–41 (Albin, J., concurring).
Id. at 339 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 340.
Scott, 163 A.3d at 340.
Id. at 341 (Albin, J., concurring).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 341.
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approach and determine whether change is needed. This Comment will
examine the arguments set forth in the concurring opinions in State v. Scott
and consider whether New Jersey should amend N.J.R.E. 608(a) and adopt
the majority approach and allow, on cross-examination, the use of specific
instances of conduct that are probative of the witness’s character for
truthfulness. Part II will review New Jersey’s approach by examining the
history and development of N.J.R.E. 608 from common law to its current
formulation and review how the rule is applied with regard to specific
instances of conduct. Part III will examine the majority approach with a
focus on the formulation and application of the federal analogue to N.J.R.E.
608, FRE 608. Part IV will assess the potential dangers of allowing specific
instances of conduct and examine the arguments and counter arguments
regarding how the majority approach addresses these issues. Part V will
examine New Jersey’s options to address this issue and amend the current
rule. Overall, this Comment will argue that New Jersey’s current
formulation of Rule 608 does not adequately address the use of specific
instances of conduct. While apprehension for allowing the use of specific
instances of conduct is valid, a complete bar raises equally valid concerns;
adoption of a rule that takes a restrictive approach will provide an adequate
compromise that properly addresses the issues raised on both sides.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF N.J.R.E. 608
New Jersey is one of seven states that have a complete bar on the use
of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for
truthfulness.31 This approach follows the New Jersey common-law rule.
Early cases made clear that an attempt to impeach the character of a witness
was limited to the witness’s reputation in the community for truth and
veracity.32 For example, in an 1883 case, Paul v. Paul,33 the court explained
31

See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.
See King v. Ruckman, 20 N.J. Eq. 316, 357 (Ch. 1869) (“But the greatest portion of
the testimony for King on this point is such as cannot be regarded. It is evidently founded
upon the fact that Ruckman has been guilty of very improper conduct with regard to the cattle
of his neighbors, [and] is a troublesome, litigious man . . . . [s]uch witnesses are necessarily
produced when they alone know or witnessed facts required to be proved; but when selected
to give character to a witness, are not of much value. The only testimony allowed in such
case is as to the general reputation of the witness impeached, in the neighborhood, for truth
and veracity . . . .”), rev’d, 21 N.J. Eq. 599 (1870); see also Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq.
150, 157 (Ch. 1869) (“[Particular transactions are] not the evidence which the law permits, or
should permit, to affect the credibility of a witness . . . . The object of the law is to show the
character of the witness as to telling the truth; general reputation in the community where he
is known, is the test and the only test which the law allows as to character.”); State v.
Hendrick, 56 A. 247, 249 (N.J. 1903) (“A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking
his character for truth and veracity but not by the proof of particular independent facts, though
bearing upon the question of veracity.”).
33
37 N.J. Eq. 23 (Ch. 1883).
32
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that unless character is the central issue, such as rape, or breach of promise,
“proof that a witness was a common prostitute, offered to impeach her
testimony, [wa]s incompetent.”34 The court cited La Beau v. People, for the
general rule that:
inquiries as to particular acts of immorality [are] inadmissible . . .
it would be impossible for the witness to be prepared for a defense
of particular acts, and it would lead to an indefinite number of
issues. Therefore, on an issue upon the character of a witness, it
cannot be allowed to inquire into particular facts.35
Thus, New Jersey courts recognized the potential dangers of allowing
inquiries into specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for
truthfulness and as a result adopted a rule barring the use of such evidence.
In State v. De Paola, decided in 1950, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
continued to apply this common-law rule.36 The defendant was charged with
murder.37 At trial, the prosecution cross-examined the defendant regarding
prior liquor-license applications in which the defendant allegedly falsely
swore to questions on the applications while under oath.38 The prosecution
aimed to use the specific instances of conduct to show that if the defendant
had lied on multiple applications, he was lying now and his testimony could
not be trusted.39 The defendant was compelled to answer the question and
admitted that each year from 1941 to 1948, he had lied on the liquor-license
applications.40
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court
erred in allowing this line of questioning on cross-examination.41 The State
argued that the ruling was within the trial court’s discretion and the
challenged evidence was permissible to show defendant’s lack of veracity.42
The court found little merit to the State’s theory, noting that there was no
authority cited in support of its contention.43
The court examined New Jersey case law regarding the approach to this
issue and found that New Jersey had adopted a “rule which excludes the
proof of independent facts to discredit a witness.”44 The court noted that the
acts referred to were not connected to the charge upon which the defendant
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 26.
33 How. Pr. 66, 72 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1865).
73 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1950).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569
Id.
Id.
De Paola, 73 A.2d at 569.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570 (quoting State v. Hendrick, 56 A. 247, 249 (N.J. 1903)).
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was being tried and were unrelated to the central issues of the case.45
Moreover, the defendant had not been convicted of perjury or false swearing
by reason of his liquor license misconduct.46 In light of these findings, the
court held that the admission of the testimony was reversible error.47
De Paola and the early New Jersey cases illustrate the rule regarding
inquiry into specific instances of conduct that New Jersey courts had
developed. Prior bad acts that did not result in a conviction that were
probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness could not be inquired
into on cross-examination. Some of the underlying rationales were that such
testimony was collateral to the main issues of the case and it would be
unreasonable to expect that a defendant-witness could be prepared to defend
against possible questioning into any area of the witness’s life.48
New Jersey formally codified the prohibition on specific instances of
conduct in 1967 under N.J.R.E. 22(d), which provided, “as affecting the
credibility of a witness . . . evidence of specific instances of his conduct,
relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be
inadmissible.”49 When N.J.R.E. 22 was prepared it was “representative of
current New Jersey [common] law.”50
In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a
Committee on the Rules of Evidence to survey the feasibility of amending
the New Jersey evidence rules.51 The Committee was to consider “whether
or to what extent New Jersey should adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence.”52
In 1991, the Committee recommended a sweeping change in the New Jersey
evidence scheme and the new rules went into effect in 1993.53 The revised
rules constituted an amalgamation of the federal and then-current New Jersey
evidence rules, following federal numeration and arrangement.54
45

Id. at 571.
Id. at 569.
47
Id. at 571.
48
See, e.g., Ippolito v. Turp, 19 A.2d 782, 784 (N.J. 1940) (“Every man is supposed to
be capable of supporting his general reputation whenever it is attacked but not to meet specific
transactions not an issue in the cause.”).
49
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 344 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (quoting N.J. R.
EVID. 22).
50
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 71 (1963)
(citing De Paola, 73 A.2d at 564)).
51
Alma G. Lopez, New Jersey’s Other-Crimes Rules and the Evidence Committee’s
Abrogation of Almost Two Hundred Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 394,
423 (1993).
52
Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J. L.J. 1, 1
(1991) [hereinafter Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee].
53
Lopez, supra note 51, at 425–26 (citing Stephen W. Townsend, Esq., Notices to the
Bar: Supreme Court of New Jersey Revisions to the Rules of Evidence, 134 N.J. L.J. 798, 798
(1993)).
54
Id. at 423.
46
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New N.J.R.E. 608 incorporated the limiting principles of N.J.R.E. 22(d)
with respect to admission of evidence of a trait of character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness when offered under N.J.R.E. 20 to affect the credibility of
a witness.55 The Committee noted that N.J.R.E. 608 followed the
formulation of FRE 608; however, the Committee rejected the provision in
paragraph (b) of the federal rule that allowed for the use of specific instances
of conduct on cross-examination.56 The Committee believed that this
rejection “retains present New Jersey practice” noting that “[N.J.R.E.],
followed by this rule, prohibited ‘specific instances of conduct’ proof in any
form if introduced to prove a trait of character.”57 Further, the Committee
believed that N.J.R.E. 607 already “afford[ed] sufficient scope for the
effective impeachment of credibility.”58 Thus, New Jersey maintained its
approach to specific instances of conduct in rejecting the federal formulation.
In 2004, a case came before the New Jersey Supreme Court that forced
the court to consider whether the general prohibition on specific conduct
evidence could be subject to an exception in a particular context.59 In State
v. Guenther, in an opinion authored by Justice Albin, the court had to decide
“whether the credibility of a witness who had accused a defendant of sexual
abuse may be impeached by evidence that [the witness] made a prior false
criminal accusation.”60 Defendant was accused by his stepdaughter, D.F., of
sexually abusing her over the course of five years.61 During trial, defendant
discovered documents revealing that D.F. admitted that she falsely accused
her neighbor of sexually abusing her.62 The defense requested permission to
cross-examine D.F. regarding this prior false accusation and in the event that
D.F. denied making the false accusation, defense stated his intent to impeach
D.F. with extrinsic evidence.63 The trial court denied this request and ruled
that “the purported false accusation was ‘irrelevant’ and ‘extremely
collateral’ and, therefore, inappropriate for consideration by the jury.”64 The
defendant was convicted of sexual assault.65
On appeal, the Appellate Division remanded for the determination of
whether D.F. made the false accusation and, if so, whether it was false.66 The
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee, supra note 52, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 309–10 (N.J. 2004).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Guenther, 854 A.2d at 309.
Id at 313.
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court directed that if the trial court found that the accusation was made but
determined that the evidence was inadmissible, the verdict would stand.67 If
the panel found, however, that D.F. made the false accusation and it was
admissible, a new trial would be necessary.68 The State petitioned for
certification arguing that the decision was contrary to N.J.R.E. 608 and the
New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to address the issue.69
The court had to determine whether the common-law principle
embodied in N.J.R.E. 608 had “continuing vitality when applied to evidence
of a victim-witness’s prior false accusation.”70 The court traced the
development of the rule noting that, “it was not a lack of relevance that gave
rise to the rule prohibiting” the use of specific instances of conduct to attack
the witness’s character for truthfulness, “but the ‘auxiliary policies’
regarding unfairness to the witness, confusion of issues, and undue
consumption of time.”71 Thus, according to the court, these auxiliary
policies illustrate that the bar on the use of specific-instance character
evidence was adopted “for pragmatic reasons associated with the efficient
and orderly presentation of a trial.”72 The court explained, however, that
when these “auxiliary policies” do not apply, “the rationale for the exclusion
of such evidence no longer exists.”73
With these principles in mind, the court then addressed whether limited
circumstances warrant an exception to N.J.R.E. 608.74 The court noted that
various jurisdictions across the country have addressed this issue and in
sexual crime cases have permitted cross-examination of a witness-accuser
who made prior false accusations involving a sexual crime.75 In light of this,
the court concluded that in a criminal case involving impeachment of a
victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case, “a
defendant has the right to show that a victim-witness has made a prior false
criminal accusation for the purpose of challenging that witness’s
credibility.”76
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 313-14.
70
Id. at 315.
71
Guenther, 854 A.2d at 315 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 979 (Chadbourn
rev.1970)).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 318.
75
Id. at 310–323.
76
Id. at 322, 324 (noting that the holding is limited to “criminal case[s] that involve[] the
impeachment of a victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case”). The
exception recognized by the court here is reflected in N.J. R. EVID. 608(b):
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by
evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person
68
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The court outlined the proper procedure for determining whether the
evidence should be admitted as well as the relevant factors to consider,
stressing that courts must ensure that “testimony on the subject does not
become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes charged.”77 The court
emphasized that its ruling was not creating a new rule of evidence, but
“merely carving out a narrow exception to [N.J.R.E. 608]” to allow for the
introduction of relevant evidence that may affect jurors’ estimation of the
credibility of a key witness.78 Thus, the court concluded this limited
exception will enhance the “fairness and truth-seeking function of a trial,”79
and is consistent with the rationale underpinning the rule.80 Guenther
illustrates New Jersey’s current formulation of the rule with the now-added
exception. Moreover, Guenther summarized the continuing rationale for
maintaining the bar on specific instances of conduct but also outlined the
circumstances that would render the rule and its underlying policies no
longer necessary.
III. MAJORITY APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS’S
CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS THROUGH SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF
CONDUCT
This Part turns to the majority approach regarding specific conduct
evidence in the context of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness and
how the rule is applied. FRE 608(b) is representative of the majority
approach. A majority of states follow the federal approach and permit crossexamination into specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the
witness’s character for truthfulness.81
of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the
judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that
the witness knowingly made the prior false accusation.
N.J. R. EVID. 608(b).
77
Guenther, 854 A.2d at 324.
78
Id. at 325.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 322.
81
Twelve states track the language from the current version of FRE 608(b) as amended
in 2011. See ARIZ. R. EVID. 608(b); DEL. R. EVID. 608(b); IDAHO R. EVID. 608(b); IOWA R.
EVID. 608(b); ME. R. EVID. 608(b); MISS. R. EVID. 608(b); N.H. R. EVID. 608(b); N.M. R.
EVID. 11-608(B); N.D. R. EVID. 608(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-608(b) (2016); UTAH
R. EVID. 608(b); W. VA. R. EVID. 608(b). Six states track the language from the version of
FRE 608(b) as amended in 2003. See COLO. R. EVID. 608(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b)
(2013); MINN. R. EVID. 608(b); OHIO R. EVID. 608(B); TENN. R. EVID. 608(b); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 906.08(2) (2018). Thirteen states track the language from the original 1975 version.
See ARK. R. EVID. 608(b); KY. R. EVID. 608(b); MICH. R. EVID. 608(b); MONT. R. EVID.
608(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608(2) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085(3) (1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2608(B) (1978); R.I. R. EVID. 608(b); S.C. R.
EVID. 608(b); VT. R. EVID. 608(b); WASH. R. EVID. 608(b); WYO. R. EVID. 608(b). Six states
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FRE 608 envisions three ways of showing that a witness is by character
or disposition either truthful or untruthful: (1) by testimony as to reputation;82
(2) by testimony in the form of opinion;83 and (3) by evidence of specific
instances of conduct.84 With respect to specific instances of conduct, FRE
608(b) uses the verb “may” in this setting, making it clear that the matter is
left to the discretion of the court.85 This raises two questions: (a) what
general considerations govern a court’s exercise of discretion under
subdivision (b); and (b) when is specific-instance character evidence
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness?86
A. What Governs the Court’s Exercise of Discretion?
While the current text of FRE 608(b) does not explicitly provide
guidance, the drafters made clear in the Advisory Committee Notes that FRE
403 and FRE 611 are relevant to the analysis.87 Thus, courts recognize that
FRE 403 and FRE 611 identify the principles controlling the exercise of
adopted only the latter part of the rule, FRE 608(b)(2); they permit cross-examination of a
character witness with specific instances of conduct about the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of the underlying witness. See ALA. R. EVID. 608(b); ARK. R. EVID. 608(b);
IND. R. EVID. 608(b); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608(B) (1989); PA. R. EVID. 608(b); VA. R.
EVID. 2:608. Connecticut, Missouri, and New York do not track the language of the federal
rule, but these states follow the federal approach and permit specific instances of conduct to
attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. See CONN. CODE EVID. § 6–6(b); Mitchell v.
Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Mo. 2010) (“[L]ong-standing Missouri law holds that the
person may be asked about specific instances of his or her own conduct that speak to his or
her own character for truth or veracity, even where the issue inquired about is not material to
the substantive issues in the case.”); People v Smith, 27 N.Y.3d 652, 660, 662 (2016)
(“[W]itnesses—and indeed, even a testifying defendant—may be cross-examined on ‘prior
specific criminal, vicious or immoral conduct,’ provided that ‘the nature of such conduct or
the circumstances in which it occurred bear logically and reasonably on the issue of
credibility.’” (quoting People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1974))). Maryland also
allows cross-examination about a witness’s prior conduct that is probative of untruthfulness,
when the questioner, if challenged, “establishes a reasonable factual basis” outside the jury’s
presence. MD. R. EVID. 5-608(b). Hawaii permits cross-examination about specific instances
of a witness’s conduct, if probative of untruthfulness, and affords judges discretion to allow
the use of extrinsic evidence. HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-608(b) (1993). California permits
evidence of specific instances of conduct to challenge a witness’s credibility in criminal but
not civil cases. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1967); People v.
Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 640–41 (Cal. 1989).
82
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
83
Id.
84
Id. 608(b).
85
Id. (“But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they
are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .”) (emphasis added).
86
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118.
87
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“[T]he
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars
harassment and undue embarrassment.”).
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discretion under FRE 608(b).88 These rules require the court to balance the
probative value of specific-instance character evidence against the potential
dangers and costs of that evidence,89 and to exercise control over the “mode
and order of examining witnesses.”90
Some of the general factors courts consider in this analysis are: (1)
whether the witness’s testimony is crucial or unimportant; (2) the relevancy
of the act of misconduct to truthfulness; (3) the nearness or remoteness of
the misconduct to the time of trial; (4) whether the matter inquired into is
likely to lead to time-consuming and distracting explanations on crossexamination; and (5) whether there will be unfair humiliation of the witness
and undue prejudice to the party which called the witness.91 It is further
recognized that courts have broad discretion in making this determination
and a trial judge’s ruling can be overturned only on a finding of abuse of
discretion.92
For example, in United States v. Bunchan, the court of appeals
addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting inquiry into
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination.93 The defendant sought
to cross-examine a government witness about pending criminal charges
88

See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118, at 101; United States v. Seymour, 472
F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 608(b) is explicit that the determination of whether to
allow specific instances of conduct to be used to challenge a witness’s reputation for
truthfulness is committed to the discretion of the district judge, and Rule 403 establishes the
standard for the exercise of the judge’s discretion in evidentiary matters . . . .”).
89
See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[T]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”); see also United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th
Cir. 1999) (finding probative value of evidence concerning character for veracity must
outweigh danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading jury).
90
See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (“The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses . . . so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment.”).
91
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 41, at 93 (5th ed. 1999);
see also United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 719 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[P]roper factors to be
employed in measuring the scope of cross-examination [are]: the importance of the testimony
to the government’s case, the relevance of the conduct to the witness’s truthfulness, and the
danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by evidence sought to be adduced.”); Telum,
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the probative
value of evidence that one of the defendant’s agents embezzled $40,000 in connection with
the plaintiff’s lease was greatly outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice).
92
See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 608.02 (2017); see also United States v. Ortiz, 5 F.3d 288, 290–91 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
no abuse of discretion in excluding, as irrelevant, personnel file of government agent offered
for impeachment and finding that Rule 608(b) expressly provided that instances of conduct
may be inquired into on cross-examination “in the discretion of the court” and that the “district
court has broad discretion in assessing admissibility of any evidence”).
93
580 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2009).
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against the witness for battery of a child and indecent assault .94 The
defendant argued that FRE 608(b) permitted the inquiry because it concerned
a specific instance of conduct relevant to the witness’s character for
truthfulness.95 The trial court permitted the defendant to elicit, through
cross-examination of the witness, that there were state court charges
currently pending against him.96 But the trial court ordered that he could not
inquire into the nature of the charges and found such an inquiry “far too
prejudicial under [FRE] 403.”97
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
restriction of the cross-examination of the witness.98 Citing FRE 403, the
court of appeals noted that the ruling allowed the defendant to raise the
possibility that the witness would receive lighter treatment on the state
charges if he testified favorably for the government.99 The court of appeals
found, however, that exposing the nature of the pending state charges was
not necessary to present such evidence.100 The court of appeals explained
that FRE 608(b) “only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the conduct is
probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness . . . .”101 The court of
appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that “the nature of the sexual assault charges [were] not sufficiently probative
of [the witness’s] character for truthfulness to outweigh the serious danger
of prejudicing the jury against him . . . .”102
Bunchan illustrates the role of FRE 403 in the determination of whether
inquiry into specific instances of conduct on cross-examination will be
permitted. This approach allows trial judges to balance the interests on both
sides and take into account particular facts and circumstances of the case
before the court. Moreover, as in this case, it allows the admittance of the
evidence where it is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness but
can limit the inquiry so as to preclude any of the dangers listed in FRE 403.
B. What Conduct is Probative of Truthfulness?
FRE 608(b) provides that a court may allow specific instances of
conduct “if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness.”103 The critical question, therefore, is what kinds of conduct
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bunchan, 580 F.3d at 71.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 608.
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are probative of truthfulness. Courts have taken three basic approaches to
determine whether certain conduct is relevant to the witness’s character for
truthfulness.104 Under the broad view, virtually any conduct indicating bad
character relates to untruthfulness.105 Under the middle view, “behavior
seeking personal advantage by taking from others in violation of their rights”
may be admissible if committed under circumstances reflecting on
veracity.106 Under the narrow view, conduct is admissible only if it directly
involves falsehood or deception, such as forgery or perjury.107
The broad view’s expansive scope of possible acts that indicate bad
behavior opens up the witness’s entire life to probing, leaving the witness
vulnerable to embarrassment and abuse.108 Recognizing these difficulties
and potential for abuse, most modern decisions avoid adopting this view.109
Most courts tend to fall in either the middle view or narrow view as they
recognize the dangers the broad view presents and insist on closer links
between the conduct and veracity.110
In United States v. Manske, the court of appeals had to decide
whether FRE 608(b) allowed cross-examination concerning a prosecution
witness’s threats of violence which were intended to influence the
truthfulness of other witnesses’ testimony.111 The trial court did not permit
inquiry into the prior instances of conduct, holding that such evidence was
irrelevant.112 Further, it noted that FRE 608(b) did not allow the use of the
threat evidence to cross-examine the witness because such evidence did not
go to character for truthfulness “but rather, to the character [for] violence and
[the witness’s] threatening nature.”113
On appeal, the court of appeals began by discussing the three
approaches in determining whether this conduct was probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness.114 The court of appeals ultimately adopted the
middle view.115 The court explained that under this view, specific-instance
character evidence is admissible when, although “the specific instance of
conduct may not facially appear relevant to truthfulness, closer inspection
104

3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:33 (4th
ed. 2018).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. (“[V]irtually no modern decisions seem to take [the broad] view.”).
110
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:33.
111
United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1999).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 775.
115
Id.
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reveals that it bears on that issue.”116 The court of appeals noted that this
more flexible standard under the middle view is a wise approach.117 This
standard allows questions that would not be embraced by the narrow view,
which precludes evidence that may not facially appear to be relevant to
truthfulness.118
Applying this approach, the court of appeals held that FRE 608(b) did
not limit inquiry only to conduct involving fraud or deceit but permits crossexamination into “acts that ‘reflect adversely on a [person’s] honesty and
integrity.’”119 Thus, the court held that “[t]hreatening to cause physical harm
to a person who proposes to testify against you is . . . probative of
truthfulness . . . .”120 The court of appeals noted that the “trial court
construed the threat evidence too narrowly” by perceiving the threats as
probative only of violence.121 The violent conduct, however, was a proper
subject of inquiry on cross-examination because under the circumstances the
threatening conduct was aimed at concealing or distorting the truth, thus
implicating the witness’s character for truthfulness.122
While these categories are recognized, courts generally confine their
analyses to the specific conduct raised before them and assess, on a case-bycase basis, whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness.123 For example, the court of appeals in United States v. Leake
considered whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow defense
counsel to cross-examine a witness regarding “various fraudulent financial
schemes.”124 In interpreting the scope of FRE 608 and, more specifically,
what matters can be raised on cross-examination, the court of appeals found
that FRE 608 “authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that are
‘clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,’ such as perjury, fraud,
swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement.”125
The court of appeals held that the instances of conduct defense counsel
intended to elicit on cross-examination were “probative of [the
witness’s] truthfulness.”126 The witness’s conduct included “obtaining
money under false pretenses,” defrauding an innkeeper, and writing checks
116
117
118
119

Id.
Manske, 186 F.3d at 775.
Id.
Id. (quoting Varhol v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1567 (7th Cir.

1990)).
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118.
United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
Id. at 719.
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that “had been returned for insufficient funds.”127 In addition, “numerous
default judgments had been entered against the witness in civil actions
seeking repayment of loans,” and the witness, or firms that he controlled,
had entered into contracts and received payment, but never completed the
work under the contracts.128 The court concluded that such conduct
“certainly establish[ed] a pattern of fraudulent activity that, if revealed,
would have placed [the witness’s] credibility in question.”129
Further examples of particular conduct that many courts have
concluded is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness include conduct that
consists of acts clearly implicating veracity such as insurance fraud,130 lying
in court,131 tax fraud,132 using a false name or identity,133 lying repeatedly,134
lying on a credit card application,135 lying on a job application,136 lying on a
license application,137 bank fraud,138 and bribery.139 Conversely, courts have
127

Id.
Id.
129
Id.
130
See United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding crossexamination concerning specific facts of insurance fraud).
131
See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Nothing could
be more probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness than evidence that the witness
has previously lied under oath.”).
132
See Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding evidence that witness
had not filed tax returns for eight years was a proper subject on cross-examination as it bore
directly on her credibility as a witness), abrogated by United States v. Lanham, 541 F. App’x
34 (2013).
133
See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A witness’[s] use
of false names or false identities is a proper subject of cross-examination under [FRE] 608.”);
United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming cross-examination about
statements made in a letter in which the witness admitted to falsifying his name, his
occupation, and the name of his business).
134
See United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 520–21 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming crossexamination regarding false statements on applications for employment, apartment, driver’s
license, loan, and membership in an association).
135
See United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no abuse of
discretion in allowing cross-examination of a witness regarding false credit card applications
“to show a general lack of credibility”).
136
See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming inquiry on
cross-examination regarding false statements the witness made on two employment
applications because the witness’s honesty or lack thereof on the applications was “plainly
probative” of his character for truthfulness).
137
See United States v. Carlin, 698 F.2d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1983) (permitting crossexamination of witness as to the “truthfulness of his answer on his verified application” for
used car dealer licenses).
138
See United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding crossexamination into alleged bank fraud was proper because such conduct “constitutes specific
instances of conduct probative of truthfulness”).
139
See United States v. Wilson, 985 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming crossexamination regarding prior acts of bribery because “bribery is probative of a witness’[s]
character for truthfulness”).
128
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generally found that conduct is not probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness where the conduct consisted of marital infidelity,140
prostitution,141 drug-related acts,142 domestic abuse,143 child abuse,144 violent
crimes,145 arson,146 murder,147 parole violations,148 manslaughter,149 and
assault.150
Thus, whether conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness is
largely left to the discretion of the court. Courts tend to look toward conduct
that clearly speaks to veracity, and if presented with conduct that is not on
140
See United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a letter
husband sent to female neighbor asking to meet up may suggest he “was not being entirely
candid with his wife,” but it does not “directly relate to [the witness’s] truthfulness and
honesty”); United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (evidence that the witness
bore one man’s child while married to another was not probative of untruthfulness).
141
See United States v. Smith, 831 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. EVID.
608(b)) (holding no abuse of discretion in not permitting questions on cross-examination that
witness dressed as a prostitute or engaged in prostitution as it would have little relevance to
her credibility as a witness).
142
See United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Kan. 2002) (“Drug use
is not admissible under Rule 608(b) because it is not probative of truthfulness.”); Elliott v.
Aspen Brokers, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1993) (“Courts generally agree that a
witness’[s] past drug activity is not probative of his character for truthfulness and routinely
exclude evidence introduced for this purpose.”).
143
See Miller v. United States, 135 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding trial
court’s decision to deny inquiry into instances of domestic violence because such acts are not
probative of a witness’s propensity for truthfulness).
144
See Starling v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 203 F.R.D. 468, 484 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding
evidence of prior charge of child abuse, which did not result in a conviction, was not a proper
subject on cross-examination under FRE 608(b)).
145
See United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding violent crimes
are irrelevant to a witness’s character for truthfulness); United States v. Peña, 978 F. Supp.
2d 254, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (prohibiting cross-examination about a witness’s violent acts
toward women and finding no reason to depart from the “general rule” that evidence of acts
relating to violence are properly excluded as having insufficient bearing on a witness’s
credibility).
146
See United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 996 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[Witness] might have
been cross-examined under Rule 608(b) as to prior instances of forgery or perjury; but
soliciting arson, although showing bad character generally, is not ‘probative of . . .
untruthfulness.’”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 608(b))).
147
See United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 43 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no abuse
of discretion in prohibiting inquiry into specific details of murder as they do not tell anything
of the witness’s tendency to be truthful); United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 615 (1st Cir.
1985) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination of witness
concerning pending murder charge under FRE 608(b)).
148
See United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding violation of
the terms of the defendant-witness’s parole was not an offense relevant to his credibility).
149
See United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding a
charge of manslaughter and events surrounding it inadmissible under FRE 608(b) because
they are not probative of the witness’s veracity).
150
See United States v. Lamb, 99 F. App’x 843, 847 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent more
specific allegations, mere assault does not impugn a witness’s credibility . . . .”).
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its face probative of veracity, courts will evaluate the evidence in light of the
circumstances to determine whether the conduct, upon closer inspection,
bears on the question of veracity.151
C. Prohibition of Extrinsic Evidence
Although FRE 608(b) permits inquiry on cross-examination about
specific instances of conduct, the rule expressly prohibits the use of extrinsic
evidence to prove such conduct occurred “in order to attack or support [a]
witness’s character for truthfulness.”152 Extrinsic evidence is evidence
“offered through documents or other witnesses,” rather than elicited from
“cross-examination of the witness himself or herself.”153 For example, in
United States v. Mangiameli, the court of appeals considered whether the
trial court erred in excluding portions of a defense witness’s testimony that
was offered to impeach the veracity of a prosecution witness.154 The defense
witness would have testified about specific instances in which the
prosecution witness lied under oath.155
The court of appeals found that evidence of multiple instances of lying
under oath was calculated to prove the prosecution witness’s general
character for veracity, and thus, subject to the restrictions of FRE 608(b).156
The court further noted that the provisions of FRE 608(b) provide that
“specific instances of a witness[‘s] conduct, for the purpose of attacking” his
character for truthfulness, “may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.”157
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the defense could properly
inquire into the specific instances of conduct on cross-examination of the
prosecution witness to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness.158 But,
by seeking to introduce the specific conduct evidence through the testimony
of another witness, the defense attempted to attack the prosecution witness’s

151

See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“A ‘rule of thumb’
thus should be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas
those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not . . . .”), superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID.
609.
152
FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir.
1995) (“The notion underlying the rule is that while certain prior good or bad acts of a witness
may constitute character evidence bearing on veracity, they are not evidence of enough force
to justify the detour of extrinsic proof.”).
153
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.20[1]; see also United States v. Boulerice,
325 F.3d 75, 82 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining testimony elicited under cross-examination is
not “extrinsic” and “[e]vidence is ‘extrinsic’ if offered through documents or other witnesses,
rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or herself”).
154
United States v. Mangiameli, 668 F.2d 1172, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 1982).
155
Id. at 1175.
156
Id. at 1175–76.
157
Id. at 1176.
158
Id.
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character for truthfulness by extrinsic evidence of conduct, “which is
forbidden by Rule 608(b).”159 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the
evidence was properly excluded.160
Moreover, the prohibition on extrinsic evidence means that once
counsel asks the witness about the specific instance of conduct, counsel is
“bound by the witness’s answer.”161 And if the witness denies the conduct,
counsel may not introduce any further evidence by way of calling another
witness or introducing physical evidence, to prove the witness committed the
act.162 Thus, FRE 608(b) requires the cross-examiner to “take the answer of
the witness.”163
For example, in United States v. Goings, the court of appeals held that
the trial court properly excluded written evidence that a government witness
failed to repay the entire advance from her next paycheck.164 The court of
appeals explained that FRE 608(b) allows cross-examination about specific
instances of conduct that concern the witness’s character for truthfulness,
“but forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific bad
act occurred.”165 Therefore, after the witness specifically denied that she had
ever failed to fully repay a payroll advance from her next paycheck, “the
defendants could not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict her.”166
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH TO
IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS’S CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS
THROUGH SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT
A. Dangers of Allowing Inquiry into Specific Instances of Conduct
While specific-instance character evidence may be relevant to the
question of whether a witness is testifying truthfully, the use of such
evidence may cause problems with judicial administration and unfairness to
159

Id.
Mangiameli, 668 F.2d at 1176.
161
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez,
76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that if a witness denies making a particular
statement on collateral matter, the examiner may not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove
that witness did in fact make that statement); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654–55
(11th Cir. 1984) (excluding evidence that government witness shot someone after he denied
it on cross, because such evidence “falls squarely within Rule 608,” which limits inquiry to
questions on cross).
162
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:36.
163
Id.; see also United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding if the witness denies conduct, it may not be proved by extrinsic evidence and the
questioning party must take the witness’s answer).
164
United States v. Goings, 313 F.3d 423, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2002).
165
Id. at 427.
166
Id.
160
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the parties.167 In fact, it has been argued that a complete bar on the use of
specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness
may be the preferable approach “given the dangers of prejudice (particularly
if the witness is a party), of distraction and confusion, of abuse by asking
unfounded questions, and the difficulties of determining whether particular
acts relate to character for truthfulness.”168
In his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Justice Albin illustrated these
problems and noted that this form of impeachment has been prohibited
because “the probative value of such questioning is outweighed by the
potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a
case . . . .”169 Moreover, Justice Albin explained that the threat of collateral
attacks regarding specific instances that are “wholly unrelated to the
litigation” could potentially discourage “crime victims from coming forward
and injury victims from bringing their claims.”170 Such a threat might also
deter defendants from taking the stand, and as a result, deprive the jury of
their testimony.171 Finally, parties would be encouraged to “forage for
impeachment evidence to launch wide-ranging attacks on a witness’s
credibility.”172
One of the general dangers presented by specific-instance character
evidence is the potential to confuse or distract the jury from the substantive
issues being tried.173 Evidence of specific acts is usually not relevant to the
issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for the jury.174 In
addition, it is doubtful that a jury would be able, even after instruction, to
167

See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct
Evidence to Impeach, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 769, 770–79 (2008) (discussing benefits and costs of
misconduct impeachment, focusing on the adverse effect such evidence has on accurate fact
finding, the tendency to encourage witness harassment, and the potential for undue delay); 2
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 979, at 1105 (1904) (“[E]ach additional witness introduces the entire group of questions as
to his qualifications and his impeachment, and the amount of new evidence thus made possible
may increase in far greater than geometrical proportion to the number of new witnesses, so
that the trial may become in length extremely protracted, and with relatively little profit . . .
[the] additional mass of testimony on minor points tends to overwhelm the material issues of
the case and to confuse the tribunal . . . .”).
168
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 92.
169
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 340 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 35 (“Evidence of witness character also
can undermine the integrity of jury decision-making by distracting the jury from the issues in
the case and inducing a decision on an improper basis.”).
174
See id. (“[U]nlike evidence of bias or prior inconsistent statements, evidence
concerning witness character bears no specific link to the facts or parties in a case.”); see also
United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that evidence of police
officer’s misconduct was not material to defendant’s guilt or innocence).
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limit its consideration of specific instances of conduct solely to the
evidence’s effect on the witness’s character for truthfulness.175 More
concerning is when the witness is a party, which makes the ramifications of
this prejudicial effect especially serious. In a criminal case, this evidence
exposes a testifying defendant to the danger that the jury may believe that
the defendant is a bad person deserving of punishment, regardless of whether
he or she committed the offense.176
Misconduct evidence also raises questions concerning the appropriate
treatment of witnesses. Such evidence creates potential for unfairness and
embarrassment.177 Wigmore suggested that imposing limits on misconduct
evidence was compelled by common decency: “[T]he ruthless flaying of
personal character in the witness box is not only cowardly—because there is
no escape for the victim—and brutal—because it inflicts the pain of public
exposure of misdeeds to idle bystanders—but it has often not the slightest
justification of necessity.”178 Witnesses face the potential for unfair surprise
because opposing counsel can forage through a witness’s past and inquire
into any conduct from his or her life that may bear on truthfulness.179 This
presents an unfair challenge as witnesses cannot be expected to defend
against every aspect of their lives, thus increasing the chances a witness “will
be surprised by, and unprepared to respond to, totally unfounded charges of
misconduct.”180 Misconduct evidence also may deter witnesses from coming
forward for fear of being publicly humiliated since witnesses may be
subjected to an unrestrained public dissection of their character, thus
depriving “justice of the fullest opportunity to obtain useful testimony.”181
175
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2]; see also Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”)
(citation omitted)).
176
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:34; see also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 3, § 6112 (“[W]hen the jury receives evidence that a witness is a bad man, it may be
inclined to punish the party associated with that witness.”).
177
See Gold, supra note 167, at 778.
178
Id. (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 979, at 826 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)).
179
See State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 342 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (“Under our
current rule, we have concluded that it would not be fair that a witness must answer for his
whole life and respond to long ago instances of untruthful conduct.”).
180
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 37; see also WIGMORE, supra note 167, §
979, at 1105 (“This unfairness here lies in the fact that the opponent who desired by other
witnesses to impeach by particular instances of misconduct might allege them as of any time
and place that he pleased, and that, in spite of the utter falsity of the allegations, it would be
practically impossible for the witness to have ready at the trial competent persons who would
demonstrate the falsity of allegations that might range over the whole scope of his life.”).
181
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2] (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
§ 921, at 724 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)); Gold, supra note 167, at 778 (“This ‘ruthless flaying’
can even undermine accurate fact-finding. Witnesses may be reluctant to come forward, and
important evidence may be lost, when witnesses are to be subjected to in-court dissection of
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Finally, each of these dangers present the underlying possibility of
causing undue delay.182 The potential for “mini-trials” and side-excursions
into each witness’s past, which as noted above is usually not relevant to the
substantive issues of the case, create a real danger of not only confusing the
issues but prolonging the trial.183 There is also the possibility that a witness
may not dispute the alleged misconduct but “may want to provide an
explanation that diminishes its import or testify to other conduct that reveals
the misconduct to be unrepresentative of her character,”184 thus further
detracting from the main issues and wasting time on collateral matters
wholly unrelated to the case.
B. Arguments for Using the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a
Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances
of Conduct
While the use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s
character for truthfulness presents various dangers, conscious awareness of
these concerns provided the basis for crafting FRE 608.185 Specific conduct
evidence is not permitted wholesale and is subject to various limitations. In
his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Chief Justice Rabner illustrated the
benefits of the majority approach, noting that there are safeguards put in
place that protect against the acknowledged dangers.186 In addition, Chief
Justice Rabner emphasized that New Jersey’s current formulation shields
witnesses from being questioned about specific-conduct character evidence
that bears directly on credibility and thus has the effect of presenting
witnesses to the jury “under an artificial light.”187 Therefore, the majority
approach as represented by FRE 608 is crafted in a way to alleviate the
dangers outlined in the previous section and gives equal weight to the
competing concern of fostering the search for the truth.188

their character and past conduct.”).
182
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2]; Gold, supra note 167, at 778
(explaining that limits on the admissibility of misconduct evidence can be justified on the
ground that such evidence has the potential to “burden a trial with distracting and timeconsuming detours from the central issues”).
183
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 39 (“[W]ithout limits on admissibility, a
case can dissolve into a series of mini-trials examining the life history of each witness. Such
a process would distract and confuse the jury, thus undermining the fundamental goal of
accurate fact-finding.”).
184
Gold, supra note 167, at 779 (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 983, at
841(Chadbourn rev., 1970)).
185
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes.
186
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 339–40 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
187
Id. at 336, 339.
188
See id.
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First, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognized the potential for abuse and dangers, thus the federal rule was
crafted to address the dangers of permitting specific conduct evidence.189
The Advisory Committee Notes to subdivision (b) provide, “[e]ffective
cross-examination demands that some allowance be made for going into
matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial.
Consequently[,] safeguards are erected in the form of specific
requirements . . . .”190 Those requirements include that the conduct be
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.191 Moreover, the overriding
protection of FRE 403 requires that probative value not be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury.192 FRE 611 further bars harassment and undue
embarrassment of witnesses.193
One of the major limitations contained in FRE 608(b) is the prohibition
on the use of extrinsic evidence.194 This limitation is designed to protect
against undue delay as well as confusion of the issues.195 As explained
above, when a witness is questioned about prior misconduct, counsel is
“bound” by the witness’s answer and may not introduce extrinsic evidence
to prove the misconduct.196 Thus, counsel may not call another witness or
bring in other evidence to disprove a denial and show that the conduct
occurred.197 Absent this limitation, impeachment of the witness could trigger
time consuming mini-trials on collateral issues.198 This concern illustrates
the principal purpose of this safeguard—to limit the time spent on issues that
are not central to the case and to maintain the focus of the trial on substantive
issues and matters bearing directly on credibility.199 In addition, the
limitation helps to reduce the extent of unfair prejudice that accompanies any
189

FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness.”).
195
See State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring); see also
United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding FRE 608(b)
excludes extrinsic evidence “to avoid minitrials on wholly collateral matters which tend to
distract and confuse the jury”).
196
See supra Part III.C.
197
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez,
76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding if a witness denies making a particular statement
on a collateral matter, the examiner may not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that the
witness did in fact make that statement).
198
See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 49, at 200-01.
199
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:36.
190
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opening into behavior bearing on untruthfulness, since such behavior is
likely to pertain to negative conduct and juries are likely to misuse the
evidence.200
In sum, as explained by Chief Justice Rabner, the bar against extrinsic
evidence alleviates the possible dangers from inquiry into specific instances
of conduct for two reasons. First, “[t]here is no danger of confusion of
issues, because the matter stops with question and answer.”201 Second,
“[t]here is no danger of unfair surprise, because the impeached witness is not
obliged to be ready with other witnesses to answer the extrinsic testimony of
the opponent, for there is none to be answered . . . .”202 Thus, many of the
major concerns that come with permitting inquiry into specific instances of
conduct are addressed and properly limited by the prohibition against
extrinsic evidence.
In addition, FRE 608(b) is also subject to FRE 403 and FRE 611 as
further safeguards to bar testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the
jury, or cause undue prejudice or harassment.203 As explained above, the text
of the rule leaves to the trial court’s discretion the determination of whether
or not to allow inquiry into specific instances of conduct.204 The court must
consider whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Moreover, the overriding requirements of FRE 403 require the court to
balance the issues and ensure that the determination is guided by the
understanding that such evidence can have a detrimental effect on the parties,
and the policies and goals of the justice system.
United States v. Shinderman provides an illustration of the careful
balancing process that courts employ.205 In this case, the court of appeals
had to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting
the government, on cross-examination, to question the defendant about his
responses to questions when applying for a medical license.206 The
defendant applied for a medical license in 2001 and 2002.207 On each
application, he answered “no” to a question asking whether he had ever
“been charged, summonsed, indicted, arrested or convicted of any criminal
200

Id.
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (quoting 3A
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 981, at 838 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)).
202
Id.
203
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“[T]he
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars
harassment and undue embarrassment.”).
204
See supra Part III.A.
205
United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2008).
206
Id. at 19.
207
Id. at 16.
201
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offense.”208 The government had evidence that defendant had been arrested
twice for drug-related offenses, although neither arrest resulted in a
conviction.209
The government wanted to cross-examine the defendant regarding the
applications, in order to cast doubt upon his truthfulness.210 The defendant
objected and moved to exclude such an inquiry.211 He admitted that he had
been arrested, but asserted that the arrests had been expunged thus, he had
answered the questions truthfully and on the advice of counsel.212 Defendant
offered an affidavit from his counsel to support this contention.213 The trial
court concluded that the affidavit “provided ‘no convincing ground’ to
support the defendant’s belief that the arrests had vanished” and did not have
to be disclosed on the applications.214 The trial court ruled that the
government could cross-examine defendant about his arrest-related answers,
but precluded the introduction of the arrest records themselves into
evidence.215
In assessing this ruling, the court of appeals noted that a trial judge’s
discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination is “subject to the
overarching need to balance probative worth against prejudicial impact.”216
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and emphasized that a
“witness’s willingness to lie to the government in an application for a license
is highly probative of his character for truthfulness.”217 Moreover, the court
found that “temporal considerations” weighed in favor of permitting the
evidence since defendant’s answers were “not remote in time but, rather,
were roughly contemporaneous” with the criminal conduct charged.218
Finally, the central factual issue at trial pertained to the defendant’s intent,
making his credibility “highly relevant to the outcome of the case.”219
After determining that the misconduct evidence could be a matter for
cross-examination under the requirements of FRE 608(b), the court then
addressed the question of prejudice.220 The court noted that evidence of prior
208

Id.
Id.
210
Id.
211
Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 16.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules)
(noting that the balancing function is spelled out in FRE 403).
217
Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 17.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
209
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arrests carried some potential for adverse effect, however, it ultimately
concluded that the effect was not particularly inflammatory or of such
detriment to compel exclusion of the evidence.221 Also relevant to this
determination, the court explained, were the affirmative steps the trial court
took to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice.222 The trial court did not permit
the government to elicit any unnecessary or “tawdry details” regarding the
arrests.223 The trial court “allowed the defendant to tell the jury about the
ultimate disposition of the arrests and about his belief that they had been
expunged,” and additionally, “offered to give a limiting instruction.”224
This case highlights the arguments in favor of the majority approach
and illustrates all of the factors properly taken into account by trial judges
when determining whether cross-examination into specific instances of
conduct is appropriate. Further, the case demonstrates that this role given to
judges is not taken lightly and the rule requires in-depth balancing which
serves to alleviate and account for the possible dangers from the use of
specific instances of conduct.
C. Counterarguments to the Use of the Majority Approach to
Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through
Specific Instances of Conduct
While the federal rule was crafted with these dangers in mind, it is
argued that the limitations in FRE 608(b) and the other rules of evidence do
not provide adequate safeguards to prevent these dangers, and in some cases
actually serve to create additional concerns. As explained by Justice Albin
in his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has “determined that ‘wide-ranging collateral attacks on the general
credibility of a witness’ may lead to jury confusion and distract the jury from
‘the true issues in the case.’”225 Justice Albin argued that these concerns are
not diminished merely because extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced.226
221
Id. (“We long have recognized that ‘all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is
only unfair prejudice which must be avoided.’”) (quoting United States v. RodríguezEstrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir.1989))).
222
Id.
223
Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 17.
224
Id.
225
State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 342 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (quoting State v.
Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 315 (N.J. 2004)).
226
Id. at 342–43 (“Allowing expansive collateral attacks on a witness’s credibility
through prior specific conduct would likely have the unintended consequence of prompting
attorneys to forage through a witness’s past . . . . Such prior acts of dishonesty would bear
little relevance to the [witness’s] credibility in court but likely would have an outsized effect
on the jury’s evaluation of that witness. The admission of the singular incident, or incidents,
of untruthfulness would allow the jury to engage in the most simplistic and dangerous
assumption—once a liar, always a liar.”).
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Justice Albin also cautioned that the only limitation guarding the expansive
use of specific instances of conduct is Rule 403, which leaves all of the
concerns and potential for danger within the discretion of trial judges.227
First, regarding the limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence, it is
recognized that the exclusion of extrinsic evidence of specific conduct to
impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness does not completely eliminate
the danger of confusion and prejudice from inquiry into collateral matters
“because the very question itself can convey the theoretically barred
information to the jury.”228 Merely asking a question about a specific
instance of misconduct and leaving with the jury only a bare denial from the
witness can have prejudicial effects on the witness as well as allow the jury
to engage in speculation on an issue that is collateral to the merits of the
case.229
Moreover, the phrase that the cross-examiner must “take the answer of
the witness” does not mean that the cross-examiner cannot continue pressing
for an admission that the past conduct did occur.230 FRE 608(b) authorizes
this procedure.231 Thus, while counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer,”
this merely means extrinsic evidence may not be introduced.232 Counsel may
proceed, however, with questioning and continue pressing for admission, for
instance, “by reminding the witness of the penalties for perjury.”233 This
227

Id. at 341–42.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[2][c][ii]; see also MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:34 (“Simply asking can impeach. Few opportunities for
lawyers provide better opportunity to inject prejudice and collateral issues into a case than
cross-examination of witnesses on prior acts for purposes of suggesting untruthfulness. In
some respects, this mechanism of impeachment invites abuse because the examining lawyer
almost cannot lose.”).
229
Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J., concurring); see also United States v. Davenport,
753 F.2d 1460, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The prejudice to the defendant was, thus, created by
the question itself rather than by the testimony given in response. The danger in such a
situation is that the prosecution will use the question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into
the jury box, knowing that the witness’[s] denial will only serve to defend her credibility,
while leaving uncontradicted the reference to the defendant’s prior bad conduct.”); Gold,
supra note 167, at 775 n.25 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn
rev., 1970)) (“This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to by
counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which they are forbidden
directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the question (not caring that
it is answered negatively) to convey their convert insinuation.”).
230
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1].
231
See id.
232
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; see also United States v. Ling, 581
F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he examiner must be content with the witness’[s]
answer . . . . Although the cross-examiner may continue to press the defendant for an
admission, he cannot call other witnesses to prove the misconduct after defendant’s denial.”).
233
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 104, § 6:36 (“[T]he cross-examiner need not take the first answer given. The very
idea of cross implies testing and probing, which necessarily means that the lawyer conducting
228
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creates concern for undue harassment and still leaves open the threat of jury
distraction and confusion pertaining to issues collateral to the merits of the
case.234
Second, apart from the limitation on extrinsic evidence, the only
safeguard on the use of specific-instance character evidence is Rule 403.235
The concern with Rule 403 is that while it does take into account the dangers
that are associated with cross-examination on specific instances of conduct,
trial courts are given broad discretion to make this determination.236 Thus,
all of these concerns are left in the hands of one judge and the determination
cannot be overturned unless the reviewing court finds an abuse of
discretion.237 It has been argued that the task of regulating prejudice
delegated by Rule 403 allocates broad power to trial judges to make
individualized decisions about the relative importance of competing
principles, and as such is “inconsistent with the general hierarchical structure
of our legal system. Trial judges customarily exercise more limited,
reviewable discretion within a framework of standards set by higher
authority.”238
Moreover, as Justice Albin noted, even in cases involving similar
conduct, different judges may come to different conclusions when weighing
the Rule 403 factors or when determining whether conduct is probative of
truthfulness.239 Thus, it is argued, the admissibility of potentially damaging
evidence is improperly left to a case-by-case determination that may not be
uniformly or consistently applied.

the cross-examination must have a chance to press and even to push the witness.”).
234
MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J.,
concurring) (“Concerns about witness fairness and jury confusion are not diminished merely
because extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to impeach the witness.”).
235
Scott, 163 A.3d at 341–42 (Albin, J., concurring).
236
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
237
See United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We typically review
Rule 403 determinations for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5,
17 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Rule 403 judgments are typically battlefield determinations, and great
deference is owed to the trial court’s superior coign of vantage. ‘Only rarely—and in
extraordinarily compelling circumstances—will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record,
reverse a district court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative
value and unfair effect.’”) (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st
Cir. 1988))).
238
J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence,
64 IND. L.J. 831, 832 (1989).
239
Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J., concurring). Compare Gustafson v. State, 590
S.W.2d 853, 859 (Ark. 1979) (finding inquiry about theft under Rule 608(b) proper), with
Rhodes v. State, 634 S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Ark. 1982) (modifying Gustafson finding
interpretation of Rule 608(b) too broad and holding inquiry about theft improper).
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V. NEW JERSEY’S OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE AND MAKE CHANGES
TO THE CURRENT RULE
While Justice Albin expressed valid concerns regarding the use of
specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for
truthfulness, a complete ban on any use of such evidence presents equally
troubling concerns. There are options to address the issues on both sides.
Allowing inquiry into past misconduct does have benefits. While it is
recognized that it can be difficult to point to past conduct and determine with
any degree of certainty whether the witness is telling the truth or lying,
credibility is a critical issue in almost every case.240 “Character evidence,
despite its flaws, may still serve a purpose in calling to the jury’s attention
to what might be an otherwise unknown deficiency of the witness and thus
give the jury a more adequate basis for judging his testimony.”241
“Witnesses are often carefully groomed and coached by counsel to
project an in-court character which suggests a high level of credibility.”242
“Evidence [that reveals] the true character of a witness can be used to poke
holes in this facade.”243 Further, character evidence can act as a check on an
attorney to discourage the offering of an unreliable witness because that
witness’s lack of credibility could be revealed by opposing counsel on crossexamination.244 Finally, admitting evidence regarding a witness’s character
for truthfulness can advance accurate fact-finding (a basic policy goal of the
evidence rules), because “just as a jury can be prejudiced against the plaintiff
by the inclusion of some evidence, it can be misled by the exclusion of other
evidence.”245
In light of the costs and benefits of allowing specific instances of
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness and taking into
account the arguments posed by both sides, it seems that New Jersey’s
current formulation does not do enough to address all of the concerns. The
case that ignited this debate between the justices highlights the problems
with New Jersey’s current formulation. Where the prosecutor had a good240

WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[1].
Id. (quoting Mason Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA
L. REV. 498, 534 (1939)).
242
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 32; see also Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy:
Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 481, 484–86 (1987) (discussing “courtroom style” psychological techniques lawyers use
that are aimed at inducing juries to employ an extralegal basis for its decisions).
243
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 32.
244
Id.
245
Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that “there are
two sides to the 608(b) coin,” prejudice and probative value, and exclusion of evidence solely
because it may be prejudicial cuts against the primary policy implicated by FRE 608,
accuracy, by depriving the jury of information that bears directly on a witness’s credibility
leading to inaccurate results).
241
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faith basis to ask the question, why should it be improper to ask a witness
whether she had lied before to protect her son about a serious matter? Such
an inquiry bears directly on the witness’s character for truthfulness. As
expressed by Chief Justice Rabner, however, New Jersey’s approach shields
witnesses from this type of inquiry and as a result impedes the search for
truth and presents witnesses to the jury in an artificial light.246
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile why N.J.R.E. 608(b) allows
evidence of a witness’s prior false criminal accusations but inquiry into a
witness’s statements made to exonerate a person is prohibited.247 The New
Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Guenther that its decision was not made
“on constitutional grounds, but rather by making a narrow exception to
N.J.R.E. 608 consistent with the rationale of that rule.”248 Thus, the question
remains as to what the logical difference is between a prior false statement
of accusation and a prior false statement of exoneration that justifies the
disparate treatment under N.J.R.E. 608. In addition, the exception to
N.J.R.E. 608 that resulted from Guenther, now 608(b), allows “[t]he
credibility of a witness in a criminal case [to] be attacked by evidence that
the witness made a prior false accusation . . . .”249 This exception not only
allows inquiry into specific instances of conduct but goes beyond the federal
rule and does not prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence; rather it is left within
the discretion of trial judge as to whether such evidence should be
admitted.250 Thus, it is difficult to understand why FRE 608(b) is disfavored
when it provides a rule of limited admissibility, protects against the dangers
presented by specific instances of conduct, and does not go as far as N.J.R.E.
608(b) by prohibiting extrinsic evidence.
The facts of State v. Scott provide a good example of how FRE 608(b)
could be applied to avoid any of the concerns regarding the use of specific
instances of conduct.251 The State sought to introduce evidence of two prior
occasions on which the witness, Barbella, allegedly lied to police to
exonerate her son, the defendant.252 Applying FRE 608(b), the trial judge
246

State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 335, 339 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 339–40 (“False testimony to exonerate is just as troublesome as a false criminal
accusation. Both impede the search for the truth. Indeed, it is hard to explain to the public
why one area can be probed and not the other.”).
248
State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 322 (N.J. 2004).
249
N.J. R. EVID. 608(b) (emphasis added).
250
Id.; see also Guenther, 854 A.2d at 324 (“Among the factors to be considered in
deciding the issue of admissibility are . . . the number of witnesses, the items of extrinsic
evidence, and the amount of time required for presentation of the issue at trial . . . . If the
court, pursuant to its gate-keeping role, determines that evidence of the prior false accusation
is admissible, the court has the discretion to limit the number of witnesses who will testify
concerning the matter at trial.”).
251
See supra Part I.
252
Scott, 163 A.3d at 328.
247
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would have the discretion to admit the evidence. Whether such evidence
could be permitted would be subject to Rule 403 and any testimony that
would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue prejudice would
not be permitted. The majority in Scott, and Chief Justice Rabner in his
concurring opinion, noted that there was a question concerning the
prejudicial effect that could result from asking about this prior conduct
because it reveals that the defendant had previously been in trouble with the
police.253 The trial judge, however, could sanitize the evidence and only
allow the State to ask whether Barbella lied to the police to exonerate others
in the past. Thus, by removing the fact that she had lied to exonerate her son,
the prejudice that could result against the defendant is eliminated but the jury
would still receive the information that relates to the witness’s character for
untruthfulness. In addition, if Barbella chose to deny that she had made those
statements, the prosecutor, under FRE 608(b), would have to take the
witness’s answer and no extrinsic evidence could come in to prove that
Barbella engaged in the alleged conduct.
Given this illustration and the competing concerns regarding specific
instances of conduct, it would be beneficial for New Jersey to change
N.J.R.E. 608(a) to align with the majority approach.
While the
disadvantages outlined above do present valid concerns, New Jersey could
use the federal rule as a starting point and craft a rule that will take into
account the arguments and concerns expressed on both sides. The states
have created different ways to handle the use of specific instances of conduct
with many taking a more restrictive approach. For example, Tennessee’s
rule, which follows a more restrictive approach, could be a framework for
New Jersey to follow.
A. Tennessee Approach
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness,
other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following
conditions, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness or concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which the character witness
being cross-examined has testified.254
Both FRE 608(b) and Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) allow for the
253
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Id. at 333; id. at 339 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).
TENN. R. EVID. 608(b).
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impeachment of a witness by inquiring on cross-examination into specific
instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.255
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) also does not permit the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to prove the specific instance of conduct had occurred.256
Tennessee, however, has a number of added procedural safeguards that
are designed to prevent common types of abuse on cross-examination.257
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) has three specific provisions that must
be satisfied in order to use specific conduct evidence to attack a witness’s
character for truthfulness:
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s
presence and must determine that the alleged conduct has
probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the
inquiry; (2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten
years before commencement of the action or prosecution, but
evidence of a specific instance of conduct not qualifying under
this paragraph (2) is admissible if the proponent gives to the
adverse party sufficient advance notice of intent to use such
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
contest the use of such evidence and the court determines in the
interests of justice that the probative value of that evidence,
supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) If the witness to be
impeached is the accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must
give the accused reasonable written notice of the impeaching
conduct before trial, and the court upon request must determine
that the conduct’s probative value on credibility outweighs its
unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. The court may
rule on the admissibility of such proof prior to the trial but in any
event shall rule prior to the testimony of the accused. If the court
makes a final determination that such proof is admissible for
impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the
trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.258
Tennessee also added a further restriction concerning juvenile conduct which
has no comparable federal provision for such evidence.259 Tennessee Rule
of Evidence 608(c) provides:
Evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness committed
while the witness was a juvenile is generally not admissible under
this rule. The court may, however, allow evidence of such
255

FED. R. EVID. 608(b); TENN. R. EVID. 608(b).
TENN. R. EVID. 608(b).
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Robert Banks, Jr., Some Comparisons Between the New Tennessee Rules of Evidence
and the Federal Rules of Evidence Part II, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 531–36 (1990).
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TENN. R. EVID. 608(b).
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Banks, Jr., supra note 257, at 536.
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conduct of a witness other than the accused in a criminal case if
the conduct would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is
necessary for a fair determination in a civil action or criminal
proceeding.260
B. How New Jersey Can Incorporate Tennessee’s Rule to Address
Justice Albin’s Concerns
New Jersey has the capability of drafting a restrictive rule similar to
Tennessee in order to fully address the concerns expressed by Justice Albin.
Similar to Tennessee, New Jersey can require a hearing to determine that a
reasonable factual basis exists for cross-examining a witness about specific
instances of conduct and whether the alleged conduct has probative value in
assessing the credibility of the witness. In addition, in criminal cases, the
rule could require counsel to give pretrial notice of intent to question a
witness about misconduct, provide an evidentiary basis, and show that the
probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice.261 This would expressly
incorporate the requirements of Rule 403 into the language of the rule, make
notice of the intent to use specific conduct evidence a requirement, and place
a burden on the party seeking to admit such evidence to present specific facts
and circumstances.
Moreover, if still not satisfied by Rule 403, New Jersey could adopt an
altered balancing test for courts to employ in making the determination
regarding prejudice. Minnesota, for example, in criminal cases, requires the
court to employ a balancing test that “is not the Rule 403 test favoring
admissibility unless probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by unfair
prejudice.”262 Rather, the rule incorporated the balancing test used by the
court in State v. Fallin,263 and under this test, “the court should not allow the
cross-examination if probative value and unfair prejudice are closely
balanced.”264 The evidence should not be allowed unless the prosecutor
establishes that the probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs the
potential for unfair prejudice.265 Thus, this rule would err on the side of
exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the evidence is a closer call.

260

TENN. R. EVID. 608(c).
Minnesota also has a similar restriction. See MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) (prosecutor must
give pretrial notice of intent to question defendant or defense witnesses about misconduct,
providing evidentiary basis, and showing that probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice).
262
MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.
263
540 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1995).
264
MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment (citing
State v. Fallin, 540 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1995)).
265
Id.
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New Jersey can adopt a time limit that declares certain actions after a
specified number of years presumptively barred. New Jersey could take this
a step further and set a shorter time limit than the ten-year limit in
Tennessee’s rule and add any further burdens on the party seeking to present
such evidence. New Jersey could also add further restrictions as deemed
necessary like Tennessee did by adding subsection (c) to its rule to address
specific concerns in particular contexts. Further, New Jersey could adopt
restrictions and standards to help guide judges when making the
determination to allow cross-examination into specific instances of conduct.
With regard to conduct that is probative of truthfulness, New Jersey can elect
to take the narrow view which provides that conduct is admissible only if it
directly involves falsehood or deception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Guenther explained that
New Jersey bars “the use of prior instances of conduct to attack the
credibility of a witness for two essential reasons: to prevent unfairness to the
witness and to avoid confusion of the issues before the jury.”266 These goals,
however, can be met by carefully crafting a rule that would address such
concerns and at the same time provide for the use of specific instances of
conduct in cases, like the case at issue here, where such instances bear
directly on a witness’s veracity. As Justice Albin explained when writing
for the court in State v. Guenther, when “the ‘auxiliary policies’ underlying
the rule do not apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence no
longer exists.”267 As shown by FRE 608(b) and the majority of states that
have adopted similar rules, it is possible to adopt a rule that will address the
auxiliary polices and under such a rule, the rationale for total exclusion of
specific instances of conduct would no longer exist.
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State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 314 (N.J. 2004).
Id. at 315.

